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Abstract: 
Organizational resilience is defined as the organization’s ability to absorb 
strain and preserve or improve functioning despite the presence of 
adversity. Existing scholarship implicitly assumes that organizations 
experience and respond holistically to acute forms of adversity.  We 
challenge this assumption by theorizing how adversity can create 
differential strain, affecting parts rather than the whole of 
organizations.  We argue that relations among those parts fundamentally 
shape organizational resilience.  We develop a theoretical model that maps 
how the differentiated emergence of strain in focal parts of an organization 
triggers the movements of adjoining parts to provide or withhold resources 
necessary for focal parts to adapt effectively.  Drawing on core principles of 
theories about intergroup relations, we theorize three specific pathways—
integration, disavowal, and reclamation—by which responses of adjoining 
parts to focal part strain shape organizational resilience. We further 
theorize influences on whether and when adjoining parts are likely to select 
different pathways.  The resulting theory reveals how the social processes 
among parts of organizations influence member responses to adversity, 
and ultimately organizational resilience. We conclude by noting the 
implications for organizational resilience theory, research and practice.   
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ABSTRACT 
Organizational resilience is defined as the organization’s ability to absorb strain and 
preserve or improve functioning despite the presence of adversity. Existing scholarship 
implicitly assumes that organizations experience and respond holistically to acute forms 
of adversity.  We challenge this assumption by theorizing how adversity can create 
differential strain, affecting parts rather than the whole of organizations.  We argue that 
relations among those parts fundamentally shape organizational resilience.  We develop a 
theoretical model that maps how the differentiated emergence of strain in focal parts of 
an organization triggers the movements of adjoining parts to provide or withhold 
resources necessary for focal parts to adapt effectively.  Drawing on core principles of 
theories about intergroup relations, we theorize three specific pathways—integration, 
disavowal, and reclamation—by which responses of adjoining parts to focal part strain 
shape organizational resilience. We further theorize influences on whether and when 
adjoining parts are likely to select different pathways.  The resulting theory reveals how 
the social processes among parts of organizations influence member responses to 
adversity, and ultimately organizational resilience. We conclude by noting the 
implications for organizational resilience theory, research and practice.   
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Organizational resilience is defined as the organization’s ability to absorb strain 
and preserve or improve functioning despite the presence of adversity (Sutcliffe & 
Vogus, 2003). Existing research typically portrays the resilience of collectives—groups, 
organizations, and communities—as anchored in the collective processing of information 
about environmental perturbations, system properties and capabilities, deviations from 
operating parameters, and resource constraints and needs.  The resilient organization 
possesses a collective “intelligent wariness” (Reason, 1997); an “organizational 
intelligence” gathers and analyzes realistic information by which to comprehend complex 
situations (Catino & Patriotta, 2013). The guiding premise is that the organization-as-a-
whole is the key entity, the center through which information is processed and decisions 
are made about how to create and divert resources to cope with unexpected situations 
(Sutcliffe & Vogus, 2003) and control unwanted variability (Madni & Jackson, 2009).  
This theoretical portrait, however, does not align with a certain reality of what 
often occurs in organizations: adversity affects and is responded to not by the 
organization-as-a-whole but by that part of the organization in which it is most directly 
located (Horne & Orr, 1998). When full-blown crises, natural disasters, and destructive 
attacks occur, they engage the organization-as-a-whole, rallying members all at once to 
face existential threats (James & Wooten, 2010; McFarlane & Norris, 2006) and support 
one another (Dutton, Worline, Frost, & Lilius, 2006; Powley, 2009).  Yet such events are 
rare; more common are mounting demands that threaten to overwhelm capacities 
(Williams, Gruber, Sutcliffe, Shepherd & Zhao, 2017; Woods & Wreathall, 2008).  In 
such cases, we argue, the primary actor is not the organization-as-a-whole but its parts—
groups, teams, functions, departments, and hierarchical levels.  Hollnagel and Woods 
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(2006) note the need for such a focus when they write that there is “ample practical 
experience to show that some parts of an organization may be safe while others may be 
unsafe.  The safety of an organization … depends on the ways in which they [the parts] 
are coupled and how coordination across the parts is fragmented or synchronized 
(p.354).”  What scholars have not yet conceptualized is how such fragmentation or 
synchronization occurs during sustained adversity and shapes organizational resilience. 
We start from the assumption that sustained adversity can trigger strain that gets 
localized, as specific parts of organizations experience excessive demands on capabilities 
that, unmitigated, can lead to impaired performance (Woods, 2006); and that localized 
strain differentiates parts of organizations. In making this assumption, we challenge an 
underlying premise within existing scholarship on organizational resilience: that the 
organization-as-a-whole is the primary actor when dealing with adversity. We believe 
that attention to the “geography of strain” is critical to understand, as under certain types 
of adversity, strain appears locally and weakens particular parts in ways that diminish 
organizational capabilities. Defining organizational resilience solely in terms of the 
organization-as-a-whole risks framing and treating strain as an isolated problem and 
ignoring the broader implications to organizational functioning and resilience of how 
strain is experienced and managed.  In other words, unmitigated strain that emerges in a 
part of an organization can, over time, impair the performance of the organization itself. 
The focus on relations among parts of organizations has the potential to reframe 
how managers can enable organizational resilience.  First, when resilience is theorized as 
rebounding from crises, managers tend to look for dramatic cues that signal assaults on 
the whole organization.  Theorizing resilience in terms of strain that appears relatively 
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slowly, in a part of the organization, enables managers to attend to weaker cues such as 
increasing gaps in performance or mounting distress among members; such cues signal 
operational breakdowns that can spread across time and space and leave the organization 
vulnerable to crisis.  Second, when resilience is conceptualized in terms of the whole 
organization, the strains that emerge in specific parts risk being treated as only local 
problems. When managers are better attuned to the significance of relations among parts, 
they are more likely to see the problems of “other” parts as important to them as well and 
act accordingly. Third, when resilience is thought to be located in the organization-as-a-
whole, managers will pay close attention to the signals emanating from senior leaders 
rather than to strain accumulating at the front lines of organizations.  They are less likely 
to map for themselves the emerging geography of strain, which ought to dictate their 
responses to adversity. Thus, in theorizing the impact of differentiated strain on parts of 
organizations, we offer managers more tools to enable resilient organizations.  
To enable this reframing, we develop a theoretical process model that maps 
dynamics and pathways triggered by the emergence of differentiated strain in specific 
parts of organizations.  That adversity sets in motion the choices of unaffected parts to 
provide or withhold important resources that can help affected parts adapt effectively.  
We delineate three pathways—integration, disavowal, and reclamation—triggered by 
those choices.  Drawing on social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner, 1975) 
and its elaborations about intergroup relations (Alderfer, 1987; Ashforth & Mael, 1989; 
Hogg, van Knippenberg & Rast, 2012), we offer a nuanced view of how in-group and 
out-group dynamics affect the responses of parts of organizations and the implications for 
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organizational resilience. Further, we explain the influences on why those responses 
emerge and dictate different sequences in organizations.  
Our theorizing offers three primary contributions to organizational resilience 
scholarship.  First, we introduce the geography of strain. We follow how differentiated 
strain fragments organizations into affected and unaffected parts, which move together 
and apart in ways that ultimately shape organizational resilience. Second, we use 
concepts from theories of intergroup relations to describe three pathways through which 
unaffected parts react to accumulating strain in affected parts.  These pathways reveal 
how social processes influence organizational responses to adversity, and ultimately, 
resilience. We also explain why organizational parts respond in particular ways and 
traverse these pathways.  Third, we incorporate temporal aspects into theorizing 
organizational resilience.  We make explicit how relations among differentiated parts 
unfold over time, which itself becomes a key contributor or inhibitor of resilience.   
REIMAGINING ORGANIZATIONAL RESILIENCE 
Differentiated strain and its effects can be seen across various organizations.  
Consider the hospital emergency department (ED). The ED exists at the boundary of 
patient demand and hospital services; it can easily become the overcrowded way station 
for patients who, for lack of appropriate hospital resources, wait for triage, testing and 
evaluation, handoffs, and discharge or admitting.  As they wait, more patients arrive, 
varying in the severity of ailments.  The ED becomes overcrowded, as patient demand 
exceeds available space, staffing, and diagnostic technologies.  Such overcrowding sets in 
motion a series of events described by Wears and colleagues (Wears & Perry, 2006; 
Wears, Perry, Anders, & Woods, 2008). As patient demand increases, ED shifts medical 
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staff between trauma, pediatric, severe and mild illness rooms as needed.  The 
accumulation of critically ill patients forces ED members to now treat some patients and 
not others, re-purpose closet spaces, and place able patients in chairs rather than gurneys.  
With mounting demand and the lack of additional resources, the ED can enter “free-fall:” 
staff members are able only to track patients and offer medical care only to those in 
immediate danger.  Other parts of the hospital (i.e., radiology, labs, inpatient floors, 
consulting services, senior hospital leaders) remain largely unaware or unconcerned with 
what is occurring in the ED. 
This process of ED degradation plays out over time rather than as a catastrophic 
event, such as a neighborhood fire that sends dozens to the hospital. Demand can slowly 
accumulate from exogenous forces, such as the closure of community psychiatric 
hospitals that leave patients increasingly using the ED for mental health needs (Hoot & 
Aronsky, 2008).  As more mental health patients turn to the ED (aided by local police at a 
loss as to where else to take them), the ED becomes, over weeks and months, a system 
under mounting pressure.  Left to its own devices amidst accumulating demand, the ED 
would pass through various states of functioning (see Hollnagel & Sundstrom, 2006; 
Wears, et. al., 2008). The unit would shift from typical functioning (i.e., usual solutions 
to deal with usual problems without system degradation) to regular reduced functioning 
(i.e., adaptations consume buffering capacity, chronically degrading the ability to absorb 
sudden disruptions).  As the number of patients grows, the ED would shift to irregular 
reduced functioning (i.e., attempts to develop compensatory buffers to manage 
disturbances), and later, to disturbed functioning (i.e., using novel and highly irregular 
resources to maintain operations).  Ultimately, ED “free fall” would mean discontinuing 
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operations for all but the most critical patients. The ED has become “brittle:” significant 
gaps in the continuity of effective care threaten patient safety, engender possible crises, 
and diminish hospital effectiveness (Nemeth, Wears, Woods, Hollnagel, & Cook, 2008).  
Existing theory is unlikely to frame this scenario in terms of organizational 
resilience. Yet this scenario highlights the boundary conditions for our reimagining and 
theorizing organizational resilience.  First, strain emerges in a particular part of an 
organization over time, distinguishing that part from other, relatively unaffected parts.  
Second, the strain in that part accumulates as mounting demand for services are placed 
upon front line staff.  Third, the affected part’s accumulating strain is at least partly 
amenable to relief from other parts, which could provide resources to lessen demand, 
increase capacity, or share the burden.  These boundary conditions are relatively common 
at the front lines of organizations that serve clients, customers, and patients. Similar to 
the ED, the capacities of TSA airport security can become severely strained, as airport 
construction or the addition of new airlines place immense pressure on TSA workers.  
The call centers and field workers of local electrical utilities can come under fire from 
customers and media for a series of outages caused by the prolonged replacement of 
equipment and technology. The accumulation of opioid-related crimes can severely 
overwhelm the caseloads of social workers entrusted with the welfare of increasing 
numbers of children placed at greater risk by families severely disturbed by opioid-
related deaths and incarcerations.  In each case, the front lines are pushed to the edge of 
effective functioning by exogenous situations unfolding over time.   
Organizational scholars are likely to conceptualize these situations in terms of 
operational difficulties (Kantur & Isein-Say, 2012; Madni & Jackson, 2009).  The front 
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lines lack appropriate resources, do not operate efficiently, or are powerless to stem 
demand or force others to provide relief.  These explanations are reasonable.  Yet they do 
not admit the possibility that front line struggles signal problems for the resilience of the 
organization itself.  The mounting strain of the front lines would scarcely register in most 
organizational resilience frameworks (for exceptions, see Woods & Branlat, 2011; 
Woods & Wreathall, 2008).  If they did register, responses would likely involve 
aggregating the thoughts and behaviors of front line staff to inform collective efforts to 
synthesize intelligence and improvise shared solutions (Madni & Jackson, 2009; Powley, 
2009; Westrum, 2006).  This too is reasonable. Yet it misses a crucial point: what 
happens between groups is crucial to understanding and enabling organizational 
resilience.  To explore this more fully, we introduce two conceptual frames integral to our 
theory building: creeping strain, and intergroup facets of organizational resilience.  
Creeping Strain 
 Relations between parts comes into sharp relief when we consider how adversity 
emanates not simply from catastrophic errors, scandals, crises, and disasters (Meyer, 
1982; Vogus & Sutcliffe, 2007) but from challenging risks, stresses, and disruptions of 
routines (Boin & McConnell, 2007; Woods, 2006).  Both types of adversity involve 
strain.  They diverge in terms of how and where strain manifests and unfolds.  In crises, 
the organization-as-a-whole itself is quickly understood as under assault; members across 
the organization mobilize to reduce collective strain and recover operations (Meyer, 
1982; McFarlane & Norris, 2006; Pearson & Clair, 1998).  The synchronization that 
occurs among the different parts of an affected organization to protect, defend, and 
maintain operations is expansive, obvious, and relatively fast.  In less startling 
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circumstances, adversity can present much differently, as unfolding situations cause 
strain in only some parts of an organization (Boin & Van Eeten, 2013).  When members 
perceive strain as belonging to those parts, rather than to the organization itself, 
synchronization becomes a different matter not yet theorized in organizational resilience. 
We anchor our theorizing efforts with an understanding of a specific category of 
adversity likely to target parts of organizations.  “Creeping developments” are complex, 
emergent, and interactive processes that lead to adverse situations (Cunha, Clegg & 
Kamoche, 2006).  Unlike sudden events, these developments unfold over time, as 
expected issues mount and interact in ways that form unexpected processes that expand 
in scope (Cunha, et. al., 2006).  We suggest that creeping strain—defined as the gradual 
development of situations that stretch a group’s resources to the point of impairment—
manifests in the more clearly exposed parts of organizations, such as the hospital’s ED or 
the utility’s customer service call centers or field representatives. These parts are 
typically front lines, located at the boundary between organizations and external 
constituencies (Kinman, 2009), where members are regularly subject to potentially 
overwhelming non-novel demands (Woods, 2006).  This includes, for example, the 
accumulation of airport passengers at security lines, leaving TSA workers to deal with 
irate passengers frustrated by long wait times.  Or the mounting opioid-related family 
problems that confront child welfare agency social workers with gradually expanding 
caseloads. Creeping strain that remains unmitigated and isolated within front lines creates 
a metaphorical “geography:” strain is located within focal parts, on the periphery of 
which sit unaffected adjoining parts, i.e., ancillary groups or teams, business units, 
functions, or hierarchical levels.  
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The focus on creeping strain reveals processes of organizational resilience that 
otherwise go unnoticed.  Definitions of organizational resilience emphasize the 
absorption of strain (Sutcliffe & Vogus, 2003) by which people and systems 
accommodate variability and preserve stability (Wildavsky, 1991).  How strain is 
absorbed and variability is accommodated, however, is often ignored when scholars focus 
on how organizations “bounce back” from adversity, i.e., how they recover and heal from 
ruptures that created pathology (Bonanno, 2004).  That more typical focus underplays 
how resilience consists of people’s abilities to maintain stable equilibrium even as they 
experience transient perturbations in normal functioning (Bonanno, 2004).  We argue that 
the absorption of strain, accommodation of variability, and maintaining of stable 
equilibrium in organizations is located squarely in the relations among parts that become 
differentiated by creeping strain.  By considering the gradual unfolding of creeping strain, 
we can focus more clearly on how the relations between focal and adjoining parts 
fragment or synchronize organizations. 
Our concern with how well or poorly parts synchronize amidst creeping strain is 
rooted in the implications for organizational resilience.  When people and systems cannot 
absorb the variability and quantity of events, and reach the limits of their adaptive 
capacities, organizations become vulnerable to rupture (Woods, 2006; Woods & 
Wreathall, 2008).  The over-accumulation of interruptions can shift an organization from 
resilient to fragile (Rudolph & Repenning, 2002), exhausting its capacity to adapt as non-
novel disturbances cascade (Woods & Branlat, 2011). Systems degrade and render 
organizations vulnerable to crisis (Rudolph & Repenning, 2002).  They become “brittle.” 
In materials science, a material that has become brittle under high stress has lost its 
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ability to stretch and adapt; it snaps, its original form ceasing to exist altogether (Gordon, 
1978).  In organizations, brittleness refers to the inability of members to make positive 
adjustments amidst strain (Sutcliffe & Vogus, 2003); gaps in uniform functioning appear, 
as members cannot adjust strategies and recruit resources to handle mounting demand 
and strain (Woods & Patterson, 2000; Woods & Wreathall, 2008).  Resilience has been 
compromised, to the point that the organization, fragmented into uncoordinated parts, is 
vulnerable to large-scale ruptures.  The organization weakens through the accumulation 
and advance of challenges that are ignored or discounted (Williams, et. al., 2017). 
Intergroup relations play a central role in understanding how relations between 
focal and adjoining parts shape organizational resilience amidst creeping strain.  The 
underlying premise is that adversity in organizations pose challenges not simply for 
operational health but for relationships within those organizations (Kahn, Barton, & 
Fellows, 2013; Pearson & Clair, 1998; Powley, 2009).  We build on that idea, placing 
intergroup relations in the foreground of what happens in organizations amidst creeping 
strain that slowly rather than immediately destabilizes organizations.  Conceptualizing 
these processes requires grounding in theories from intergroup relations scholars. 
Intergroup Facets of Organizational Resilience 
 We draw upon concepts from intergroup relations scholars to theorize dynamics 
among parts of organizations differentiated by strain.  In particular, we are interested in 
how adjoining parts respond to focal parts in which strain is located. Organizations are 
social systems comprised of parts that may be nested (dyads within groups, teams within 
divisions), adjacent (business units, departments), and hierarchical (executives, front-line 
workers) in relation to one another.  The collaborative and competitive dynamics between 
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these parts mark organizations as “crucibles of intergroup relations” (Hogg, et.al., 2012: 
233).  The movements of adjoining parts to alleviate or avoid focal part strain signal 
whether intergroup competition or collaboration holds sway.  More to the point, those 
reactions signal how adjoining parts frame focal part strain: as the legitimate province of 
the focal part, or as the province of the organization itself.   
Examining this more closely requires theory about intergroup relations. Social 
identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1985) created the intellectual foundation for intergroup 
relations, and as such, offers several key theoretical anchors.  First, people are drawn 
toward social categories, such as organizational membership, religious affiliation, gender, 
and age cohort, as the means by which to classify themselves and others. These social 
categories allow people to more easily identify themselves relative to others (Tajfel & 
Turner, 1985).  Second, social identity theory predicts that those not part of a group with 
which people identify will be evaluated more harshly.  Social identities thus depend on 
intergroup social comparisons by which people seek to confirm or establish their own 
distinctiveness in relation to members of defined out-groups (Turner, 1975). Individuals 
thus use their identifications with social groupings to define themselves, as with or 
against others (Hogg & Terry, 2000).  These dynamics enable us to conceptualize the 
reactions of adjoining to focal parts. 
A further conceptual building block is that of intergroup boundaries.  Building on 
social identity theory, Alderfer (1987) articulated the importance of physical and 
psychological boundaries to social identities in organizations.  He noted that that the 
permeability of boundaries, i.e., the ease with which they can be crossed, regulates 
transactions among groups (Alderfer, 1987).  Boundary permeability is shaped by the 
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compatibility of interests between groups (Campbell, 1965; Sherif, 1966).  When 
interests are compatible, boundaries between groups loosen, as members expand their 
ideas of who is inside the groups (i.e., who “we” are).  The perception of incompatible 
interests leads to relatively impermeable boundaries, as groups close off from perceived 
“others” (Campbell, 1965; Sherif, 1966).  Further, boundary permeability is shaped by 
group differences in power (Alderfer, 1987). More powerful groups, defined as those 
more able to obtain and deploy resources, can deny access to groups unable to demand or 
influence compliance (Tajfel & Turner, 1979).  
Social identity theory suggests that boundary permeability (and the power to 
regulate boundaries) is particularly integral to intergroup relations under conditions of 
resource scarcity (Tajfel & Turner, 1979).  As groups compete to claim scarce resources, 
negative relations are more likely, leading to greater boundary impermeability (Alderfer, 
1987).  Under these conditions, groups will compete with one another to acquire or 
protect resources, and become antagonistic (Campbell, 1965).  Groups polarize, with 
positive feelings associated with own groups and negative feelings toward other groups 
(Turner, 1975), driving groups away from cooperative attitude and behavior (Sherif, 
1966) amidst perceptions of zero-sum competition (Blake, Shepard, & Mouton, 1964).  
Affective patterns are further buttressed by cognitive formations (and distortions) that 
anchor perceptions of “other” groups to positive or negative attributions, and justify 
intergroup cooperation or polarization, respectively (Alderfer, 1987; Turner, 1975).   
Affective patterns and cognitive formations shape and are shaped by group 
member identifications.  Social identity theory posits that the more that individuals 
identify with groups or organizations, the more likely they will think and act in 
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accordance with that referent identity (Tajfel & Turner, 1979).  When identity threats or 
intergroup competition for resources (Kramer, 1991) make salient group identification, 
groups will more likely compete rather than cooperate (Brown & Williams, 1984; Turner, 
1975).  When organizational identity is salient, adjoining parts will value organizational 
interests more (Ashforth & Mael, 1989; Hogg & Terry, 2000) and be more motivated to 
engage in prosocial behavior and cooperate with other groups (van Knippenberg, 2003).  
The salience of particular identities will thus anchor and justify how adjoining part 
members think about, feel towards, and act in relation to focal parts, according to whether 
those focal parts are considered inside or outside meaningful group boundaries. 
Strengthening group identity can thus make adjoining part boundaries more rigid, 
building group capacity and making organizational resilience less likely.  The shoring up 
of organizational identity can relax those boundaries (see Turner, 1975).  This occurs as 
adjoining parts propagate particular causal attributions about focal parts.  Causal 
attributions are lay explanations of cause-effect relationships (Matrinko, Douglas, & 
Harvey, 2006; Ross, 1977).  Adjoining parts can locate blame for differentiated strain 
within focal parts, unfolding situations, organizations, or other adjoining parts.  Such 
attributions are then embedded within accounts that adjoining parts develop to justify 
actions toward focal parts.  Accounts are discursive constructions of reality that describe 
or explain unfolding situations (Antaki, 1994; Maitlis, 2005), imbuing them with 
meaning that shapes subsequent group action (Weick, 1993).  The power of adjoining 
parts within their organizations likely determines the nature and influence of their 
accounts, permeability of their boundaries, and actions toward focal parts. 
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Our theorizing involves articulating pathways created by the movements of 
adjoining parts to provide or withhold resources—technology, knowledge, space, people, 
money—that could alleviate focal part strain.  These pathways unfold in the context of 
creeping strain that gradually depletes the resources of focal parts.  The pathways hinge 
upon if and when adjoining parts identify their interests as compatible with focal parts. 
We acknowledge the inevitable press in organizations for members to identify with their 
groups, via divisional and functional silos, incentive systems, and other aspects of loose 
coupling (Weick, 1976).  This is, in effect, a press toward the fragmentation of parts.  Yet 
cross-boundary collaboration and synchronization (Gittell & Douglas, 2012; Rerup, 
2009) remains possible amidst differentiated strain, along pathways described below.  
MODELING INTERGROUP PROCESSES OF ORGANIZATIONAL 
RESILIENCE 
We draw on intergroup relations concepts to develop a process model that traces 
how the reactions of adjoining parts to a strained focal part shape processes of resilience.  
The process model (see Figure 1) offers a relatively simple version of focal-adjoining 
part dynamics, in which adjoining parts themselves remain unaffected by adversity.  This 
enables us to theorize essential dynamics.  Later, we examine some of the complications, 
including the strain of adjoining parts, affecting those dynamics.  
_________________________________________________________ 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
_________________________________________________________ 
  
As noted earlier, resilience is defined by the absorption of strain.  While 
absorption of strain is typically theorized to occur at the collective level, we articulate 
three pathways that mark how and where that absorption occurs, and with what 
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implications, when differential strain brings focal and adjoining parts to the foreground.  
The pathways—which we label integration, disavowal, and reclamation—all involve key 
intergroup relations, based on concepts discussed above.  The pathways involve 
interrelated phases: the development of accounts by adjoining parts that guide their 
reactions to the focal part; the solidification or alteration of the identity that adjoining 
parts adopt which fuels those reactions; and the fragmented or synchronized shape of 
organizational resilience that results from adjoining part responses (see Table 1).  The 
pathways reflect the logical possible reactions that groups have to the disturbances of 
other groups within their social system, as evidenced in studies by scholars focusing on 
group relations among nurses and physicians (Menzies Lyth, 1960), airline engineers and 
crews (Miller & Rice, 1967), residential treatment center social workers and nurses 
(Miller & Gwynne, 1973), and factory workers (Hirschhorn & Gilmore, 1989).  Those 
reactions are to turn away (isolate others), turn toward (support others), or remain still 
(status quo)(Miller, 1993).  These movements drive the pathways described below. 
_________________________________________________________ 
Insert Table 1 about here 
_________________________________________________________ 
  
Each pathway is triggered by the emergence of differentiated strain that creates 
focal and adjoining parts in organizations.  Gradually increasing demand on the focal part 
forces its members to stretch resources and capacities as best they can while maintaining 
operational competence. With accumulating demand, the focal part is increasingly unable 
to maintain a uniform response.  Attempts to adjust strategies and create extra regions of 
adaptive capacity fail as the focal part becomes overmatched by accumulating quantities 
of demands and interruptions. The focal part is in danger of failing in its operational 
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functioning; it requires assistance from adjoining parts that possess slack resources to 
prevent failure and reduce organizational vulnerability.  At that point, adjoining part 
reactions can traverse distinct pathways. Of the three pathways, integration represents the 
most synchronicity amongst parts, disavowal the most fragmentation, and reclamation 
somewhere between the two.  Integration and reclamation involve moving toward a focal 
part, immediately or later; disavowal involves remaining still or turning away.  We use 
the hospital ED to illustrate these pathways.  The ED is the focal part; adjoining parts 
include radiology, labs, inpatient floors, consulting services, and senior hospital leaders. 
Integration 
 The integration pathway involves maintaining synchronicity among adjoining and 
focal parts, which join and remain together to create a larger whole to enable resilience.  
Adjoining part accounts.  Adjoining parts remain connected to and aware of 
mounting strain within the focal part by developing accounts that link their functioning. 
Adjoining parts perceive their interests as compatible with the focal part, which they 
move to include as an in-group. In the hospital, for example, radiology and lab areas add 
extra technicians to speed diagnostic testing; the admitting floor shifts personnel to speed 
up the admittance of more patients; and the Chief Medical Officer attempts to divert 
ambulances to other EDs.  We theorize that these movements reflect adjoining parts 
embracing accounts that ascribe focal part strain to the situation, the organization, or 
other adjoining parts.  The head of radiology tells her staff that the ED is becoming 
increasingly overwhelmed by psychiatric hospital closures and needs their help. Lab and 
radiology department leaders tell their staff that an overwhelmed ED, as the hospital’s 
key entry point, will affect other areas as well.  In attending to weak cues that allow 
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attentional coherence across group boundaries (Rerup, 2009), they engage in boundary 
work to connect ancillary and ED areas and facilitate patient flow (Hilligoss, 2014). 
Adjoining part identifications.  The accounts of adjoining parts in this pathway 
are founded on their identifying as part of the larger organization.  This identification 
enables adjoining parts to remain connected to focal parts and to function as integrated 
units, even when demand ebbs and strain is relieved.  Adjoining and focal parts work 
together to “size up” and create joint understandings of developing scenarios and 
problems (Bigley & Roberts, 2001).  Unlike problem-solving networks that arise and, 
once crises pass, dissolve in high-reliability organizations (Roberts, Stout, & Halpern, 
1994), these connections remain necessary for organizations to stay resilient amidst 
constant pulls toward fragmentation. Adjoining parts emphasize the compatibility of 
interests, enabling their members to maintain in-group empathy (Sherif, 1966).  In this 
respect, accounts and identifications are recursive: accounts frame and shape how 
adjoining parts identify (with) the focal part, which in turn guides further accounts.  Such 
mutual influencing occurs for each of the three pathways (as depicted in Figure 1). 
In the hospital, the Chief Medical Officer and the lab, radiology, and psychiatry 
departments act as if their work is connected to that of the ED.  The Chief Medical 
Officer talks about the ED as the “front lines,” encouraging other departments to see how 
events in the ED affect the functioning and vulnerability of the hospital itself.  The other 
parts coordinate their responses to strains that emerge within the ED.  We argue that in 
this pathway, adjoining part members base their responses not simply on organizational 
identities but on relational identities, i.e., their self-definitions include their collaborative 
relationships with the focal part (Hogg, et. al., 2012).  Thus, admitting floor nurses define 
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their unit partly on the basis of facilitating ED patient flow.  Adjoining and focal parts do 
not simply create a superordinate entity but act as if their interests are inextricably linked.  
Shape of organizational resilience.  When organizational resilience is described 
as “bouncing back” from adversity, the idea is that the organization regains “shape” after 
being deformed by strain (Sutcliffe & Vogus, 2003).  In integration, the organization’s 
shape remains a reasonably coherent system of linked parts across which flow necessary 
resources. The organization retains uniform functioning throughout, covering gaps that 
would otherwise leave the organization brittle (Woods & Patterson, 2000), as when the 
ED, with the help of adjoining parts, ensures consistently appropriate and timely patient 
care. Adjoining and focal parts are synchronized; together, they adapt to potentially 
disabling quantities of interruptions and strain. The creation of a shared concern for and 
focus on the organization (Ashforth & Mael, 1989); the attending to weak cues from front 
lines (Rerup, 2009); and the sizing up of developing situations (Bigley & Roberts, 2001) 
enable organizations to be less vulnerable to crises that could arise through lack of 
coordinated attention to strained capacities (see Rerup, 2009: Woods & Wreathall, 2008).   
Disavowal 
 In the disavowal pathway, differentiated strain fragments organizations into 
disconnected parts.  Adjoining parts remain separate from the focal part, which is left to 
its own struggles.  Adjoining parts, in effect, repudiate connections to the focal part, as if 
denying shared contexts and goals.   
Adjoining part accounts.  Adjoining parts remain distant from the focal part, 
whose interests they perceive as incompatible; they act as if moving toward the focal part 
will diminish scarce resources or otherwise prove compromising.  Adjoining parts adopt 
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a threat-rigidity response: they react to threat-based stress and anxiety by restricting 
information, constricting control, and conserving resources (Staw, Sandlelands, & 
Dutton, 1981). They blame the focal part (or other adjoining parts) for its outstripped 
capacity, strain, and operational difficulties.  Their accounts emphasize the need to guard 
in-group boundaries and resources. In the hospital, the admitting floor, lab and radiology 
departments, and psychiatry consult services rebuff requests for quicker responses to ED 
needs.  Their justifying accounts consider the ED inefficient or incompetent, or blame 
hapless hospital administrators for lack of foresight.  Such contextualized accounts are 
easily developed: hospitals include distinct professional perspectives (Apker, Mallak, & 
Gibson, 2007), strong hierarchies (Axelrod & Cohen, 1999), and practices that encourage 
physicians to work against rather than with one another (Hilligoss, 2014).  
Disavowal processes may be partly shaped by the distress of the focal part. The 
distress of one group can trigger defensive reactions from other groups, whose members 
act as if distress were contagious (Miller, 1993; Obholzer, 1994).  Distress thus has the 
potential to enhance perceptions of the focal part as an out-group—perceptions which 
fuel enduring accounts that justify adjoining parts disavowing the focal part. We also 
suggest that focal parts can develop their own causal attributions and accounts by which 
they blame adjoining parts and create narratives of their victimization (see Obholzer, 
1994). ED members might castigate others in the hospital as incompetent, self-oriented, 
and indifferent, and hospital leaders as unable to intercede.  Such complementary 
accounts maintain boundary impermeability between adjoining and focal parts, rendering 
them unable to join together to size up developing situations, create attentional 
coherence, and synchronize efforts (see Bigley & Roberts, 2001; Rerup, 2009).   
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Adjoining part identifications.  Even as demand slows and strain ebbs, adjoining 
parts can disavow the focal part, continuing to propagate accounts based on restrictive in-
group identifications.  Admitting floors, lab and radiology departments, and psychiatry 
consults continue to pay little attention to the struggles within the ED, whose members 
strive to recover from a degraded state of performance. The Chief Medical Officer does 
little to dispel this insularity, colluding with the adjoining departments continued 
perception of the ED as a separate entity.  Adjoining parts may continue to reinforce the 
idea of incompatible interests that maintain in-group ethnocentrism and out-group 
antagonism (Sherif, 1966).  These dynamics can be reinforced by cognitive biases, such 
as confirmation biases and availability heuristics (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981), by which 
adjoining parts filter information in ways that maintain threat-rigidity responses.  Such 
responses, in effect, leave the focal part “quarantined” within the organization.  The focal 
part remains isolated within boundaries it lacks the power to control or influence.   
Shape of organizational resilience.  Resilience is weakened when parts of a 
system are pathologized, ignored, distanced, withheld from, or treated with indifference 
(Shalev & Errera, 2008).  In the disavowal pathway, such actions affect the shape of the 
organization: parts are fragmented, in effect creating multiple organizations with which 
members differentially identify. This fragmentation sharply impedes or blocks the flow of 
resources to the focal part. The focal part can become a “casualty” of disavowal, sharply 
diminished by the lack of help.  The ED loses members, its staff burned out not simply by 
the pace and intensity of the work but by the dispiriting sense of failing in their roles 
(Wears & Perry, 2006). The organization becomes vulnerable to crises that arise through 
lack of attentional coherence (Rerup, 2009); adjoining parts “normalize” signals about 
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dangerously strained capacities (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2006) rather than collectively attend 
to what they imply about crises that may be incubating (Turner, 1976; Williams, et. al., 
2017).  ED members, compromised by demand that gradually outstrips their capacities, 
are at risk of misdiagnosing patients, committing medication errors, and badly 
prioritizing efforts. There is simply greater risk that, as the fragmented organization 
becomes brittle, real crises will ensue for which members are unprepared (Roux-Dufort, 
2009; Woods & Wreathall, 2008). 
Reclamation 
The reclamation pathway involves adjoining parts initially distancing from and 
then moving to include and help the focal part.  Initially, adjoining parts follow the 
disavowal pathway, using blaming attributions and accounts to justify withholding 
resources from the focal part.  At some point, however, they join with the focal part, 
supporting its efforts to regain effective functioning.  As noted further below, some 
condition shifts—in the organization, between adjoining and focal parts, within leaders—
that enables adjoining parts to move to help focal parts.  The nature and timing of 
reclamation determines the extent to which focal and adjoining parts remain, on balance, 
synchronized or fragmented, and ultimately, determines the resilience of the organization.  
Adjoining part identifications.  Reclamation occurs when adjoining parts revise 
accounts that had initially blamed a focal part for inviting overwhelming strain (“you”), 
and shift blame to the situation/organization (“us”) or to other adjoining parts (“them”).  
In effect, the focal part shifts from an out-group to an in-group. Lab and radiology 
department leaders, after rebuffing ED demands for extra help, shift to blame hospital 
administrators for not staffing to meet demand.  Such revised accounts enable adjoining 
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parts to either annex focal parts (incorporating them into expanded identities) or shift 
from group to organizational identifications by joining with focal parts to size up and 
develop strategies to handle accumulating strain (Bigley & Roberts, 2001).  The lab and 
radiology departments (as a superordinate “part”) now see the ED as a compatriot, 
struggling to work effectively amidst inadequate resources just as they do.  Adjoining 
parts thus shift to positive intergroup relations and direct resources toward the focal part. 
 Shape of organizational resilience.  Reclamation can leave adjoining and focal 
parts more or less cohered into a system of linked parts. We theorize that such coherence 
varies according to the presence of lingering fissures between adjoining and focal parts.  
More precisely, we suggest that the timing of reclamation process can minimize, create, 
or deepen such fissures.  Consider how the “quarantine” of the focal part effectively 
constricts strain within its borders. This can insure the integrity of the organization; 
medical quarantines separate infected people from others, constricting disease to 
minimize the possibility of harming wider communities (McKenzie, Pinger, & Kotecki, 
2011). The temporary disavowal of the focal part thus becomes integral to the survival of 
the larger whole, buying time to stabilize the larger system (Wildavsky, 1991).  Once the 
organization has prepared itself (or strain has subsided), the quarantine can be lifted and 
the focal part reclaimed.  The organization, its shape now a coherent whole, is less 
vulnerable to crises due to lack of coordinated attention to warning signals.   
There are, however, quarantine-related tipping points (McKenzie, et. al., 2011).  If 
the focal part is disavowed for too long, that part can become so degraded as to be no 
longer viable for reclamation.  In medical terms, the quarantine has isolated individuals 
for so long that they are too compromised to thrive.  In our terms, organizational 
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resilience is compromised when members are stuck too long in stagnation and inertia 
(Kantur & Isein-Say, 2012).  We argue that, to the extent that reclamation occurs quickly 
and fully, the degradation of the focal part will recede, enabling its members to 
coordinate effectively with adjoining parts to avert potential crises. If the other areas of 
the hospital, for example, work quickly to provide resources to clear the backlog of 
waiting patients, the hospital will retain its coherent shape. If reclamation occurs slowly 
or superficially, fissures between focal and adjoining parts will exist, leaving the 
organization vulnerable. The ED, too long bereft of help, will remain partly adrift, unable 
to coordinate flows of knowledge and information with other parts of the hospital to 
prevent crises.  The organization becomes brittle, its shape fragmented.  Adjoining and 
focal part are unable to work uniformly to cover dangerous gaps in functioning. 
Influences on Pathways Taken  
 Adjoining parts move along the pathways according to how they navigate several 
key junctures, at which decisions regarding how to engage the focal part are required. 
The first juncture occurs after accumulating demand outstrips capacity, straining the focal 
part.  At that point, adjoining parts either start along integration or disavowal pathways.  
The second juncture occurs after adjoining parts have disavowed the focal part; as strain 
continues to mount, adjoining parts either continue to disavow or shift to reclaim the 
focal part.  (In point of fact, there are multiple places at which this second type of 
juncture can occur; i.e., at various points throughout a creeping strain, adjoining parts can 
face choices about continuing to disavow or to shift to reclaim the focal part). We 
examine key influences on what occurs at these two types of junctures, working from key 
concepts from social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1985), corollary intergroup 
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relations concepts (Alderfer, 1987; Ashforth & Mael, 1989; Hogg, et. al., 2012), and 
organizational resilience frameworks (Kantur & Isein-Say, 2012; Sutcliffe & Vogus, 
2003; Wildavsky, 1991).  
 There are several types of influences on the pathways.  Two influences—
adjoining part resources, and the strain upon adjoining parts—determine whether 
adjoining parts have the capacity to support the focal part.  These are critical 
determinants at both junctures, in that they dictate whether adjoining parts are initially 
available for integration processes, and later, whether they have become available for 
reclamation processes.  Three other influences—the interdependence of adjoining and 
focal parts, the history of their relations, and their relative power—point to the existing 
intergroup relationships that facilitate or undermine adjoining part willingness to provide 
resources to the focal part.  Without capacity, of course, adjoining parts willing to help 
the focal part will be unable to do so fully.  These influences are described below. 
Adjoining part capacity.  We have assumed thus far that adjoining parts have the 
capacity to relieve focal part strain.  Yet adjoining parts may lack the resources necessary 
to do so (i.e., people, technology, space, ideas, finances, empathy).  Adjoining parts will 
vary in terms of such resources and thus how available they are to help the focal part.  As 
social identity theory suggests, group identities become salient when resources are scarce 
(Kramer, 1991), causing groups to protect their resources (Campbell, 1965).  When there 
are slack resources, organizations have resource cushions that allow them to adapt 
successfully to internal pressures for adjustment (Bourgeois, 1981).  Slack resources can 
be available, not yet assimilated into organizational design; recoverable, shifted from 
Page 26 of 55Academy of Management Review
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
 27
places in organizations in which they are currently deployed; or potential, generated by 
organizational members to fill current gaps (Bourgeois & Singh, 1983; Feldman, 2004).   
Scholars suggest that when organizations have available or easily recoverable 
slack resources, resilience is an easier proposition (Woods, 2006; Woods & Wreathall, 
2008).  Slack resources enable adjoining parts to afford to make boundaries permeable to 
the focal part. In a hospital with a relative abundance of lab workers, space, and 
machines, overwhelmed ED physicians can order anticipatory batteries of tests rather 
than wait to order more precise tests (Hilligoss, 2014), which shifts the overload to 
another part of the hospital (Wears & Perry, 2006). Slack resources thus make it more 
likely that adjoining parts will initially develop accounts consistent with integration 
rather than disavowal. The transformation of potential to available resources (Bourgeois 
& Singh, 1983; Feldman, 2004) can also enable adjoining parts to relax assumptions of 
scarcity, and move to reclaim the focal part.  In the hospital, adding three consulting 
psychiatrists moonlighting from another hospital provides needed support to the ED; the 
consulting service, by providing those resources, moves to reclaim the ED. 
 Further, adjoining parts might not be available to integrate or reclaim focal parts 
when they are focal parts, i.e., when adjoining parts are strained by adversity. Adversity-
related strain can affect multiple parts of an organization simultaneously, or creep into 
contiguous parts, creating event chains (Morgeson, Mitchell, & Liu, 2015); or multiple, 
distinct strains can affect multiple parts, triggered by different sources of adversity, and 
create event clusters (Morgeson, et. al., 2015).  Either way, adjoining parts can lose the 
potential for synchronization.  As their own operations degrade, they are unable to build 
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attentional coherence across boundaries (Rerup, 2009) or join with others to build 
collective, coherent understandings of activity systems (Bigley & Roberts, 2001).   
This scenario adds more complexity to the relatively straightforward pathways we 
describe above. Parts of organizations can shift from adjoining to focal, or vice versa. In 
the hospital, for example, failing technology might significantly disrupt the radiology 
department, whose members had started to but could not continue to relieve ED strain.  
Or the psychiatric service’s capacity to provide consults becomes gradually overwhelmed 
by the quantity and severity of ED mental health patients, to the point that its physicians 
cannot respond effectively to ED requests.  In such situations, the ability of adjoining 
parts (now also focal parts) to provide necessary resources is compromised. They are far 
less available to integrate or reclaim the (other) focal part.  Adjoining parts are then likely 
to develop accounts that position the focal part as an out-group, and make their 
boundaries less permeable in relation to that part (Alderfer, 1987). 
Facilitating and undermining willingness to help. Three factors influence the 
willingness of adjoining parts to provide resources to the focal part.  First, the 
permeability of adjoining part boundaries is likely influenced by interdependence, i.e., 
how tightly coupled adjoining and focal parts are in their daily operations. 
Interdependence between members depends on how tasks are executed, skills and 
resources are distributed, performances are assessed, and outcomes are rewarded 
(Wageman, 1995).  Each of these dimensions can tightly or loosely couple different parts 
of organizations.  This offers a mixed blessing.  Tightly coupled parts might lead to the 
spread of strain: creeping strain in one part can occur in another whose tasks are 
interdependent.  Yet tight coupling can also lead specific parts to regularly identify (with) 
Page 28 of 55Academy of Management Review
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
 29
other parts as part of the same organization, and increase the possibility of parts to be 
aware of what is occurring within other parts. So too can work practices such as cross-
functional teamwork, strategic and tactical team meetings, and boundary spanners that 
routinely integrate parts of organizations (Bigley & Roberts, 2001; Gittell, 2008). Such 
integration creates a sense of compatible interests between adjoining and focal parts, 
facilitating possible integration or reclamation. 
We suggest that as gradually mounting strain creates focal and adjoining parts, 
their pre-existing interdependence likely shapes what occurs.  When a cross-disciplinary 
team of leaders who are measured and incentivized in terms of a hospital’s overall 
performance makes decisions about human, financial, and technological resources, the 
diagnostic services (lab, radiology, consultants) and admitting floors will likely integrate 
rather than disavow the ED.  Or, as the ED is strained, the Chief Medical Officer can 
decide to split the laboratory department, dedicating a portion of its staff, technology, and 
time to the ED—and thus shift lab members’ allegiances, tying metrics and incentives to 
ED performance. Such actions restructure the organization to enable reclamation of focal 
parts (see Wildavsky, 1991). 
Second, the intergroup history between adjoining and focal parts likely facilitates 
or undermines the former’s willingness to help the latter. There are likely previous 
instances of adjoining parts integrating, disavowing, and reclaiming focal parts. 
Presumably, these instances left members of various parts feeling more connected to or 
disconnected from one another, which has implications for how willing they are to 
alleviate strain going forward.  We thus offer a temporal perspective (Morgeson, et. al., 
2015) to the dynamics of availability and boundary permeability between parts. We 
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theorize that when relations between specific parts have a legacy of being largely 
positive, adjoining parts are more likely to be available to integrate or reclaim specific 
focal parts.  In the hospital, a history of the laboratory and radiology departments 
coordinating well with one another and with the ED to offset patient influxes makes later 
integration and reclamation more likely.  Conversely, repeated disavowals of the ED by 
the psychiatric consulting service make future disavowals more likely.  Such patterns are 
likely to be reinforced by enduring accounts that become, in effect, attached to focal parts 
themselves rather than to adverse situations (see Alderfer, 1987; Maitlis, 2005).  
Third, the power of adjoining parts relative to the focal part likely influences 
pathway choices. As noted earlier, differences in power between groups shape boundary 
permeability (Alderfer, 1987): more powerful groups have the ability to obtain, deploy 
and withhold resources in relation to less powerful groups (Tajfel & Turner, 1979).  This 
suggests that when adjoining parts are more powerful than the focal part, they have the 
authority to decide whether to integrate, disavow, and reclaim.  The radiology 
department, as a revenue generator in the hospital may be more powerful than the ED and 
within limits can set its own rules for engaging the ED.  Alternatively, if the focal part 
has more power (directly, or indirectly via access to powerful senior leaders), it can 
compel adjoining parts to provide resources necessary for relieving strain, initially or 
later.  The ED might have more influence in the hospital than the newly instituted 
psychiatric consulting service, for example, and can, within limits, insist on that service’s 
cooperation.  Either way, intergroup power differences are likely to be buttressed and 
justified by rationalizing adjoining part accounts and in-group/out-group identifications. 
Leaders as Agents  
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Throughout the descriptions of the three pathways, leaders of adjoining parts and 
of organizations were influential agents on if and when adjoining parts move to integrate 
or reclaim the focal part.  In the hospital example, the Chief Medical Officer, and the 
leaders of the radiology, lab, inpatient floors, and consulting services were all 
instrumental in providing or withholding resources necessary to relieve ED strain.  
Leaders have the clearest potential in organizations to reinforce intergroup relational 
identity, in which groups define themselves partly in terms of relationships with other 
groups (Hogg, et. al., 2012).  Intergroup leadership is crucial given the pulls toward 
fragmentation among parts of organization—between union and management, 
headquarters and satellite offices, senior leaders and front-line workers—that become 
embedded in structures, routines, and processes (Gordon, 1978; Hilligoss, 2014). Leaders 
are influential agents, able to use their authority to bridge or exploit gaps between parts of 
organizations.  How adjoining and senior executive leaders use that authority determines 
which pathways are followed as focal part strain accumulates, and the nature of the 
justifying accounts and identifications they develop to shape those choices. 
Leaders can influence intergroup pathways in distinct ways.  In the structuralist 
view of leadership (see Podolny, Khurana, & Hill-Popper, 2005), they can create or alter 
the interdependence of adjoining and focal parts, the better to link their fortunes and 
instill intergroup relational identities.  This can include reward systems and 
corresponding metrics that tightly couple adjoining and focal part outcomes; structuring 
reporting relationships such that leaders think of and treat parts as connected; and job 
descriptions that require members to work across boundaries (Bigley & Roberts, 2001; 
Gittell, 2008; Wageman, 1995).  Adjoining part leaders can also advocate with senior 
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executives, or join with peers, to recover or generate slack resources (Bourgeois & Singh, 
1983) that could relieve their own strain and render them available to help the focal part. 
In the social construction view of leadership, leaders are key agents in shaping 
how their followers think of and act toward others.  Leaders are makers of meaning; they 
author narratives that frame events, situations, and actions in ways that give sense to 
others (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001; 2006).  In practice, this can involve leaders instilling 
intergroup relational identities through the use of rhetoric that emphasizes both the 
distinct contributions of parts and the integrity of the organization-as-a-whole (Hogg, et. 
al., 2012). Adjoining part members thus perceive their interests as aligned with a focal 
part, whose effectiveness becomes integral to adjoining parts’ health and welfare, and 
ultimately, that of the organization itself.  Such rhetoric is embedded in the accounts that 
leaders develop and propagate to justify decisions and actions related to integration, 
disavowal, and reclamation of the focal part.   
In addition to their use of rhetoric, adjoining part and senior executives can 
encourage mindfulness of operations to enable resilience (Sutcliffe & Weick, 2013; 
Weick & Sutcliffe, 2006).  Mindfulness is inculcated when leaders bring attention to how 
adjoining part members may be simplifying complex realities, ignoring focal part strain 
as information about the vulnerability of the organization-as-a-whole.  Leaders can 
respond to weak signals about mounting strain by posing questions to adjoining parts that 
shift them from complacency and narrowed focus and toward considering the larger 
picture of how organizations become vulnerable (Roberts & Rousseau, 1989; Weick & 
Sutcliffe, 2001).  Leaders can become rightfully suspicious of accounts that solely blame 
the focal part; and they can act upon those suspicions by involving adjoining parts in 
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developing and acting on the basis of more complex accounts (see Weick & Sutcliffe, 
2006).  The mutually reinforcing interplay of structuralist and social constructivist 
dimensions of leadership are crucial here: more complex accounts and shared 
identifications can shape and be shaped by structural dimensions of organizational life 
that press adjoining and focal part members to join together.  
CONTRIBUTIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
 Organizational resilience can be understood partly in terms of dynamics that take 
place among parts of organizations differentiated by creeping strain.  In this section we 
offer three contributions to organizational resilience theory, research, and practice. First, 
we articulate the geography of strain, in which unfolding localized adversity can 
fragment organizations into distinct parts.  Second, we leverage intergroup relations 
concepts to theorize how dynamics between those parts enact pathways—integration, 
disavowal, and reclamation—that lead to fragmented or synchronized organizations, 
shaping their resilience. Third, we focus on temporal aspects of organizational resilience 
that shape relations among parts affected by creeping strain.   
Geography of Strain 
 We have argued that when strain emerges in bounded parts of organizations—
groups, departments, functions, and hierarchical levels—it becomes differentiated rather 
than uniform across the organization. This argument challenges the implicit premise of 
organizational resilience scholarship that the whole organization is the primary actor 
amidst adversity.  This premise holds that an “organizational intelligence” (Catino & 
Patriotta, 2013) guides the collection and processing of information and the diversion of 
resources to enable the organization to adapt and perform (Sutcliffe & Vogus, 2003; 
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Woods, 2006).  Differentiated strain fragments organizations and makes this process 
complex.  We thus reimagine organizational resilience, whose guiding metaphor has been 
elasticity, i.e., the ability to absorb strain without permanently losing shape. We suggest 
instead that differentiated strain redefines the shapes of organizations, breaking larger 
systems into parts that vary in openness to and support of one another. It is not simply 
that the resilience of individuals and units, and of their organizations, is redundant or 
additive, as scholars imply (Vogus & Sutcliffe, 2007), but that relations across emergent 
borders can determine collective resilience.   
The geography of strain is not haphazard.  Differentiated strain is often located in 
the front lines of organizations.  It is at the front lines—the ED to which ambulances 
deliver patients, a TSA shift confronted by masses of travelers, a social worker unit 
gradually overwhelmed by families broken by opioid addictions—that mounting strain 
appears.  Adversity can, of course, emanate from other parts of organizations, such as 
when leaders make strategic errors or errant investments.  Weick (1988) offers a telling 
example of the Bhopal crisis, in which senior leaders allocated limited resources and set 
in motion deteriorating conditions that left a seemingly unimportant facility dangerous.  
Even in such cases, strain tends to emerge at the front lines. Their efforts to alert others to 
those developments are often ignored.  Senior leaders can avoid their responsibility for 
sizing up developing situations (Barton, Sutcliffe, Vogus, & DeWitt, 2015) by remaining 
impervious to critical information from those they consider to have lesser knowledge or 
relevance (Silbey, 2009)—even as they later blame lower levels (Perrow, 2007). Such 
stratifications of hierarchy and power make synchronization difficult.  
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 There are several implications here for organizational resilience scholarship.  
First, scholars need to consider the impact of multiple adjoining parts responding 
differently to the same focal part.  Our argument simplified this issue, treating adjoining 
parts as singular in their response.  Yet responses to differentiated strain may involve 
political dynamics, with adjoining parts responding not only to a focal part but also to one 
another.  Second, we need to understand more completely what occurs when adjoining 
parts are strained to the point that they become focal parts. Multiple, adjacent focal parts 
can spark troublesome dynamics, such as debilitating competition over scarce resources.  
Third, scholars can consider how strain is differentiated across race, gender, 
socioeconomic, religious, and occupational groups in organizations.  While our work 
focused on operational units, the larger point is that differentiated strain fragments 
organizations. This logic can apply as well to other types of organizational parts, such as 
demographic segments, with similar implications for resilience (see Chan & Anteby, 
2016; DiBenigno & Kellogg, 2014; Leana, Mittell, & Stiehl, 2011). 
Intergroup Relations of Resilience 
 Our premise is that organizational resilience is largely a social process. The social 
dynamics that we theorize occur between bounded parts of organizations.  The three 
pathways described above integrate the core principles of social identity theory (Tajfel & 
Turner, 1979) and its elaborations (Alderfer, 1987; Ashforth & Mael, 1989; Hogg & 
Terry, 2000).  We seek to expand organizational resilience theory beyond existing 
frameworks developed in the context of organizational crisis and recovery (see Williams, 
et. al., 2017).  The intergroup relations involve adjoining parts moving along particular 
pathways according to if and when they open or close their boundaries to a focal part.  
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These movements are based on whether they identify with their own groups, or with the 
organization itself. As these identities hold or shift, adjoining and focal parts engage in 
positive or negative interactions, buttressed by accounts that justify those interactions.  
These social processes shape how effectively those parts synchronize or remain 
fragmented; ultimately, they shape the strength and weakness of the organization and its 
vulnerability to crisis (see Roux-Dufort, 2017; Turner, 1976).   
These processes raise several questions for theory and research.  First, we largely 
focused on relations between adjoining and focal parts; we minimized potential 
differences within adjoining parts.  It is likely, however, that adjoining part members will 
differ in their impulses to remain apart from or alleviate focal part strain, as a function of 
different biases or motivations (e.g., prosocial, competitive).  Such splits might well 
result in ambivalent relations with a focal part; adjoining parts can start and stop and 
backtrack, tangling the straightforward pathways we theorize.  Second, members of 
adjoining parts will have reactions, such as territoriality or compassion, that render them 
more or less willing to provide a focal part with needed resources.  Empirical work is 
necessary to place those reactions within larger contexts—of hierarchy, power, and 
politics—that shape intergroup relations.  Third, leaders’ attempts to instill intergroup 
relational identities are likely shaped by their own styles, skills, and behaviors; this 
remains to be theorized or examined in organizations fragmented by differentiated strain.  
Organizational Resilience in Time  
 Relations among parts differentiated by strain surface temporal dimensions of 
organizational resilience.  These dimensions are not routinely theorized in organizational 
resilience scholarship (for exceptions, see Williams, et. al., 2017; Woods & Branlat, 
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2011; Woods & Wreathall, 2008). The traditional focus on sudden events emphasizes 
large-scale surprises that affect wide segments of organizations all at once rather than 
separately (Comfort, 2007).  Such events force synchronicity among organizational parts, 
relatively quickly, blurring distinctions between focal and adjoining parts; or rather, the 
organization itself becomes focal.  The magnitude and speed of adversity thus moderates 
what type of resilience frame is necessary.  Adversity that advances slowly, located in 
some bounded parts and not others, requires a focus on how relations among those parts 
play out over time.  In this frame, we suggest, resilience is a matter of greater and faster 
synchronicity.  Resilience is enabled when parts of organizations join together to ensure 
that localized strain does not deepen and spread, which would diminish coordination and 
leave organizations vulnerable to larger-scale adversity. 
 Several temporal aspects are important to examine further.  First, the speed with 
which focal part strain accumulates may affect how much time there is for adjoining parts 
to shift from disavowal to reclamation.  It is not clear how much time adjoining parts 
might need to gather intelligence from front lines, convene members to size up activities, 
and coordinate collective attention (Bigley & Roberts, 2001; Rerup, 2009).  Second, our 
argument focused on single creeping developments in which strain accumulates in a 
relatively straightforward fashion.  We did not theorize such accumulation amidst event 
clusters (i.e., multiple events that occur closely in time and space) or event chains (i.e., 
events that cause further events downstream or over time)(Morgeson, et. al., 2015).  
Empirical research can help map how accumulation of strain within event clusters and 
chains is exponential rather than additive, with implications for the time necessary for 
parts to join together to alleviate strain and ensure resilience. 
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 Scholars can also examine more closely how the history of certain focal and 
adjoining parts shape pathway choices.  That history might involve previous attempts to 
provide resources amidst adversity; in particular, how those attempts were experienced, 
their outcomes, and the relationships that they facilitated or undermined, all of which can 
carry over into later accounts and behaviors.  Intergroup history is also likely to both 
shape and be shaped by other influences, such as structural interdependence or the power 
of adjoining parts. Another temporal dimension involves the timing of when adjoining 
parts reached out to reclaim the focal part.  Empirical work can help identify the 
implications of how long a focal part was left isolated (“quarantined”) before adjoining 
parts alleviated its strain.  This work can specify how the timing of reclamation matters 
for synchronization or fragmentation, and ultimately, for organizational resilience.  
CONCLUSION 
 In this article we look closely at how differential strain fragments organizations 
into parts.  What remains are relationships between those parts that involve integration, 
disavowal, and reclamation.  How those relationships play out ultimately impacts 
organizational resilience.  Reason (1990) notes how underlying organizational problems 
result from “latent pathogens” that compromise defenses against challenging events; and 
that aligned workforces are best able to remove those pathogens.  We raise the question 
of what occurs when the relations between parts differentiated by strain are themselves 
latent pathogens, fragmenting workforces.  Our response to this question offers a 
compelling direction for future scholarship on how organizations become resilient or 
made brittle amidst adversity that unfolds over space and time.
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Table 1:  Summary of intergroup pathways 
 
 Integration  Disavowal Reclamation 
Pathway 
definition 
Adjoining parts maintain 
synchronicity with the focal part, 
remaining aware of its gradual 
accumulation of strain. Adjoining 
parts seek to provide helpful 
resources throughout the 
accumulation and cessation of 
focal part strain.  
Adjoining parts remain separate from 
the focal part, which is left to its own 
struggles.  Adjoining parts repudiate 
connections to the focal part, actively 
(moving away) or passively 
(remaining still).  They protect scarce 
resources and maintain distance as 
strain gradually accumulates. 
Adjoining parts follow the disavowal 
pathway until some condition shifts—
in the organization, within or between 
adjoining and focal parts, in leaders—
and adjoining parts shift to join with 
the focal part and support its efforts to 
regain effective functioning.   
  
Adjoining part 
accounts 
Adjoining parts embrace accounts 
that ascribe focal part strain to the 
difficulties of the situation, to the 
organization, or to other adjoining 
Adjoining parts maintain accounts 
that blame the focal part (or other 
adjoining parts) for its outstripped 
capacity, strain, and operational 
Adjoining parts initially use blaming 
attributions and accounts to justify 
withholding resources from the focal 
part. Reclamation occurs as adjoining 
Page 49 of 55 Academy of Management Review
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
 50
parts.  Such accounts enable 
adjoining part members to justify 
attempts to relieve focal part 
strain. 
difficulties.  These accounts 
emphasize the need for adjoining 
parts to guard their boundaries and 
resources. 
parts revise accounts from blaming the 
focal part (“you”) to blaming the 
situation/organization (“us”) or other 
adjoining parts (“them”).  
Adjoining part 
identifications 
Adjoining parts identify as part of 
the larger organization, of which 
the focal part is a member with 
compatible interests.  This 
identification enables adjoining 
parts to remain connected to focal 
parts so as to function as 
integrated units.   
Adjoining parts identify as in-groups, 
disavowing the focal part as an 
“other.” Adjoining parts perceive 
their interests as incompatible with 
the focal group; such perceptions are 
reinforced by cognitive biases such as 
confirmation biases and availability 
heuristics. 
The revised accounts enable adjoining 
parts to either annex focal parts, 
incorporating them into expanded 
identities, or shift from group to 
organizational identifications by 
joining with focal parts to size up and 
develop strategies to handle 
accumulating strain. 
Shape of 
organizational 
resilience 
The organization is a coherent 
system of linked parts across 
which flow necessary resources 
Parts are fragmented rather than 
synchronized, creating multiple 
organizations with which members 
Adjoining and focal parts are more or 
less cohered into a system of linked 
parts according to the timing of 
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that enable uniform functioning. 
The synchronized efforts of 
adjoining and focal parts allow 
the organization to effectively 
perceive, develop strategies for, 
and adapt to potentially disabling 
quantities of interruptions and 
strain. 
from separate parts differentially 
identify. This fragmentation impedes 
or blocks the flow of resources to the 
focal part, which undermines 
collective attentional coherence and 
leaves the organization brittle and 
vulnerable to crises. 
reclamation processes. Quicker, 
comprehensive reclamations leave the 
organization a relatively coherent 
whole, such as that created by 
integration.  Slower, less 
comprehensive reclamations degrade 
the focal part and leave the 
organization fragmented and brittle, 
similar to that created by disavowal.  
Influences that 
determine 
adjoining part 
capacity to 
provide help 
Adjoining parts have the 
resources—people, technology, 
space, ideas, information, 
finances, or empathy—necessary 
to help the focal part.  Adjoining 
parts are also relatively 
Adjoining parts lack the resources—
people, technology, space, ideas, 
information, finances, or empathy—
necessary to help the focal part.  Or 
adjoining parts have become a focal 
part, suffering enough strain as to 
Adjoining parts may initially lack the 
resources—people, technology, space, 
ideas, information, finances, or 
empathy—necessary to help the focal 
part, but then have slack resources 
become available, recoverable, or 
Page 51 of 55 Academy of Management Review
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
 52
unaffected by their own strain; 
their operations and resources are 
healthy enough to sustain the 
helping of the focal part. 
have compromised their own 
operations and resources.  They 
disavow as a form of self-
preservation. 
developed.  Or the strain that degrades 
adjoining parts is relieved, enabling 
them to recover operations and bring 
resources to help the focal part. 
Influences that 
facilitate or 
undermine 
adjoining part 
willingness to 
provide help 
Adjoining and focal parts are 
interdependent, tightly coupled in 
daily operations; their history is 
positive, marked by previous 
instances of integration or quick 
reclamation; and their relative 
power facilitates adjoining part 
willingness to help the focal part. 
Adjoining and focal parts are too 
loosely coupled in daily operations; 
their history is mostly negative, 
marked by previous instances of 
disavowal or slow, degrading 
reclamation; or their relative power 
status undermines adjoining part 
willingness to help the focal part. 
Loosely coupled adjoining and focal 
parts become more tightly coupled in 
daily operations; their history is 
positive enough to enable shifts from 
disconnection to connection; or their 
relative power shifts or relaxes enough 
to facilitate adjoining part willingness 
to help the focal part. 
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